This chapter provides the information on the Ninth Cape Frontier War (1877–78) and campaign against Sekhukhune and focuses on Anglo-Zulu War. The campaigns of 1877–78 were a series of largely desultory engagements, often involving small bodies of imperial troops and/or mounted police and their auxiliaries. The abortive campaign against Sekhukhune, undertaken over peculiarly difficult terrain by an under-strength force, had less impact upon British military thinking than did the bush fighting in the Transkei. For the Anglo-Zulu War, Lieutenant-General Baron Chelmsford duly assembled his army of 17,929 officers and men, including over 1,000 mounted colonial volunteers and some 9,000 natives, and also managed the variety of different forms of transport. Chelmsford launched an attack on Chief Sihayo’s mountainous kraal above the Batshe River within a day of crossing into Zululand. Chelmsford also employed the reinforcements to relieve Eshowe and entered Zululand moving slowly across the terrain and forming wagon laagers with external entrenchments.

Eyewitness accounts are among the many sources used in the voluminous literature on the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, a major test of British command, transport arrangements, and the fighting qualities of the short-service soldier. Quite apart from the writings of the late Frank Emery, who refers to eighty-five correspondents in *The Red Soldier* and another twenty-four in his chapter on that campaign in *Marching Over Africa*, there are invaluable edited collections of letters from individual officers by Sonia Clark and Daphne Child, and by Adrian Greaves and Brian Best. While the papers and journals of the British commanding officers have been splendidly edited, some perspectives of officers and other ranks appear in testimony before official inquiries (into the disasters at Isandlwana and Ntombe, and the death of the Prince Imperial) and among the sources used by F. W. D. Jackson and Ian Knight, and by Donald Morris in his classic volume *The Washing of the Spears*. Yet the letters found by Emery – the core of the material used for the views of regimental officers and other ranks – represent only a fraction of the material written during the Anglo-Zulu War. Many more officers and men kept diaries or wrote to friends and family, chronicling their exploits in that war and its immediate predecessors, the Ninth Cape Frontier War (1877–78) and the campaign against the Pedi chief, Sekhukhune (1878). While several soldiers complained about the postal arrangements or the scarcity of stamps and paper, they still wrote letters, even improvising, as Corporal Thomas Davies (2/24th) did, by using gunpowder as ink. Their correspondence forms the core of this Chapter’s review of campaigning in southern Africa.

Several of the regiments who fought the Zulus had already served in southern Africa. The 1/24th (of the 2nd Warwickshires, later South Wales Borderers) and the 1/13th (Somerset Light Infantry) had served in southern Africa since 1875; the 2/Buffs, the 80th (2/South Staffordshires) and the 88th (1/Connaught Rangers) had joined them in 1877, and the 2/24th, largely composed of short-service soldiers, had arrived in March 1878. These forces, coupled with the 90th Light Infantry (Perthshire Volunteers), two batteries of field artillery (N/5 and II/7) and the 7th Company, Royal Engineers, undertook a daunting array of garrison and other duties in Cape Colony, Natal, along the Zululand border, and in the Transvaal. Sir Arthur Cunynghame, the general officer commanding (GOC) South Africa, compensated for his lack of cavalry by forming mounted infantry from the 1/24th in 1875, and raising additional bodies of mounted riflemen, volunteers and mounted police from the colonial communities, as well as native auxiliaries, both before and during the Ninth Cape Frontier War. The Mfengu were willing to fight the Ngqika and the Gcaleka in the Transkei, while the Swazis readily joined in attacking the mountainous strongholds of the Pedi in eastern Transvaal.

Edward M. Spiers

Campaigning in southern Africa

in The Victorian soldier in Africa

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By the time Durnford, with his 250 mounted men, reached Horse, a battalion of eight hours' fighting. He
Within a day of crossing into Zululand, Chelmsford launched (2/4th), reported: 'This
Colonel Richard T. Glyn, but effectively (Thukela) River and establish a base
River and subdue the northern areas
Transvaal, respectively, while the
Chelmsford duly assembled his army
Saturday morning,
South Africa, requiring acceptance of a British
war appeared imminent (it was eventually provoked by
Although the resistance of the Ngqika and Gcaleka proved
their cattle, but their periodic displays of ill-discipline and
'an enemy before – and some of the
When another patrol of forty Connaught Rangers, twenty
elusive
demons were fighting'. Under
supported by artillery, Swazis and the Carrington Horse.
soldier of the 1/13th described how the assault was
fire-power of a
set-piece battles –
bush and periodically mounted
companies or less) and/or mounted
The campaigns of 1877–78 were
THE ANGLO-ZULU WAR: FIRST
CAMPAIGN AGAINST SEKHUKHUNE

...number of the enemy'.

...as fast as one could drink, we were so exhausted and thirsty.'

...colonials, could disperse much larger bodies of Xhosa, even without the
sixty police, supported by four 7-pounder muzzle-loading guns, sent
observed, was a debilitating experience: 'When we got to the river
I do not think there was one man but drank four canteens full

...few hundred infantry, mounted police, a rocket battery and a few guns.
At Nyamaga (13 January 1878) and Centane (7 February 1878) – they
21

...shortage of mounted men with the Centre Column, and a week later
is bad country to travel in. We marched 150 miles up country, hardly any

...Pietermaritzburg: 'I saw six soldiers flogged on
Pietermaritzburg: 'I saw six soldiers flogged on
32

...positive: 'The Connaught Rangers, boys though they are –
provide invaluable support, especially in pursuit of the enemy and
provided invaluable support, especially in pursuit of the enemy and

...of the enemy and
provided invaluable support, especially in pursuit of the enemy and
provided invaluable support, especially in pursuit of the enemy and

...and a rocket battery, to support his column.

...demands were too much for the Queen's drovers.

...which was an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 men.

...will be fought in the bush, as the Zulus were.

...to the Transkei. Many of the commanding officers and regular forces, who
60

...the estimable services of Colonel Evelyn Wood, VC, with the 90th

...cavalry and six companies of infantry, ordered to Mount Natal.

...demonstration of force in the face of theirennesse.

...planned to deploy five

...and a week later

...twenty years, he was not the only one to have

...campaign ended

...campaigns of 1877–78 were

...of water

...expedition was crippled by heat, lack of water and horse-sickness. The

...concentrated fire and periodic counter-attacks, the 1/13th had to charge

...a short time', he wrote, 'one thought the gates of

...bothered for a time, and some of the

...of the enemy before – and some of the

...an enemy before – and some of the

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other members of Chelmsford's Column, Colonel Arthur Harness, with his four guns. The remainder of Chelmsford's Column had apparently not reached the camp. After briefly stopping to examine a fallen trooper, the preparations for moving on continued. 

A 20-year-old Natal policeman would come up and pour down upon our camp. Our picket opened fire on the enemy. We got the order, 'Every man stand to his arms, and be ready for action at a moment's notice'; and then dashing through the Zulus, we rushed to the camp. The infantery was in the camp; our men were scattered to the four winds, a few being in the camp. 

At the final stages of the battle, where survivors back to Helpmekaar, after the battle, he immediately ordered the construction of a wagon laager to afford protection. 

Despite these shortcomings, the correspondents corroborated aspects of the battle, not least Colonel Durnford's actions. At the battle of Hlobane, Dr. Teignmouth Melvill, 1/24th, and others had warned of the dangers of the Zulus. 

Captains Edward Essex, Pulleine, and Teignmouth Melvill, 1/24th, and others had warned of the dangers of the Zulus. They gave the impression of organised resistance collapsing – an 'embellishment' of the accounts, as F. W. D. Jackson has observed, 'do not always agree with the testimony and the location of the Zaraffu battle'. Moreover, these accounts, as F. W. D. Jackson has observed, 'do not agree with the testimony and the location of the Zaraffu battle'. 

Of the European survivors, most of the British soldiers who escaped from the hands of the enemy lost their lives in crossing the Tugela River. 

Of the Zulu survivors, there were nearly 1,800 men at Isandlwana; by the early afternoon, the Zulus had already learned from Lieutenant John Chard, RE, whom he had met at the battle of Rorke's Drift. Chelmsford had already been shocked by the experience and were not always lucid in their recollections; others embellished their accounts, even in the case of H. A. Grant, the six members of the 1/24th (Privates Grant, Johnson, Trainer, and others) had warned of the dangers of the Zulus. 

Rupert Lonsdale had encountered the main Zulu force on 21 January 1879. He also required Pulleine to keep his cavalry vedettes moving on the distant hills, but had neither entrenched it (which would have been difficult on the hard stony ground) nor organised a lager (a time-consuming and skilled task that may have seemed superfluous for a temporary camp). 

Chelmsford's Column arrived on 22 January 1879. He was not only unprepared for a possible attack, but also unprepared to meet the Zulus as they approached. Fearing the Zulus, Chelmsford returned to Rorke's Drift. He immediately ordered the construction of a wagon lager to afford protection. 

In a letter to his mother and brother, he explained: 'Thank God for teaching me to swim. My horse fell in the water, and both of us went down together, and both swam out again.'
On the same day as the battle of Isandlwana, the British columns were struggling across the river-laced terrain of long grass and bush, gaining a foretaste of how slow and frustrating movement would be in the terrain.

At sunrise the spectacle was even worse. Secretan observed, 'We were lying amongst horses and oxen all lying down��. . . I myself was lying in a hospital, they being unable to move with the fever. We kept our rounds of ammunition per man.' There were four men burned alive in the hospital, and, thank God, whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled.

Our men opened fire at 500 yards. As the Zulus chased us, but the men inside the fort resisted with nothing for slaughter. They were resisted with assegais. These they did not use but used bayonet: 'seven or eight times at least, Lieutenant Bromhead, bayonet and charged out of the house . . . There were about 30 other members of Chelmsford's staff. . . . I myself was lying in a missionary's dwellinghouse, and the soldiers found the camp deserted.' Similar feelings, whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled.

Several soldiers who had guns were stationed on the hill, and kept up a steady volley of fire; but a few miles from the camp, the general and staff set fire to the little house used as an aid station, and, thank God, whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled. From the hospital a Dundonian in the afternoon . . . Others came on in a continuous stream, occupied their dancing, with a prancing step and high action; they cared nothing for slaughter. They were resisted with assegais. These they did not use but used bayonet: 'seven or eight times at least, Lieutenant Bromhead, bayonet and charged out of the house . . . There were about 30 other members of Chelmsford's staff. . . . I myself was lying in a missionary's dwellinghouse, and the soldiers found the camp deserted.' Similar feelings, whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled.

As Nyezane. The column had spent ten days struggling across the river-laced terrain of long grass and bush, gaining a foretaste of how slow and frustrating movement would be in the terrain.

Secretan (Natal Mounted Police) noted, 'We were lying amongst horses and oxen all lying down. . . . I myself was lying in a hospital, they being unable to move with the fever. We kept our rounds of ammunition per man.' There were four men burned alive in the hospital, and, thank God, whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled.

Whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled: 'The enemy', wrote Private P. Thomas (2/24th), 'ran away, and there was very nearly overpowered us. They quickly bayoneted, the soldiers found the camp deserted.' Similarly many were quick to blame Durnford for the debacle. Whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled.

Advance party broke and run, taking advantage of every marksmen the place was untenable, but they fired wildly and poorly. At sunrise the spectacle was even worse. Secretan observed, 'We were lying amongst horses and oxen all lying down. . . . I myself was lying in a hospital, they being unable to move with the fever. We kept our rounds of ammunition per man.' There were four men burned alive in the hospital, and, thank God, whether these stories, like similar tales, are quite garbled.

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approaching along the valley below, Buller's March Wood attacked this stronghold using a pincer on the ranks of Wood's irregulars, but the refractory Wood kept despatching mounted forces under Buller to seize back the fort: as Lieutenant A. V. Payne observed:

"I have not had a single letter from home yet: we are reading some news.'" Booth's section provided covering fire because of the gaps between the wagons and the distance was between 60 and 70 yards. Sixteen wagons carrying stores, ammunition and provisions from Lydenburg to Natal, escorted by 106 soldiers of the 80th under Captain D. B. Moriarty. As the river had been swollen by heavy rain, sixteen steps were needed to cross it.

Although the Zulus had pre-empted and fortified the Tugela and its mountainous tributary, the Ntombe, it was a delay that had cost the British time and lives. While Dr Mansell, a surgeon with the column, appreciated that these were not ideal conditions for an expedition to the interior:

"The heat is intense, and the flies virulent under the intense heat -- a thousand of them bit me yesterday!

Yet the gunners, who were mainly volunteers, sometimes vented their frustration on the Zulus with disposable 2-pounder rifles instead of their much-needed heavier armament.

The column moved on to a Scandinavian mission at Eshowe, where work began on the construction of a fort. This involved digging a trench 61 feet deep, and 20 feet wide, with stakes planted tightly together and sharpened stakes linked by wire to entangle the legs of any onrushing Zulus. Some Zulus surrendered, but, as Mansell noted, "the men were much depressed about the auxiliaries' losses,' and the auxiliaries' rotation had become a means of "sleeping with their boots on" because of the gaps between the wagons and the distance was between 60 and 70 yards.

The column's length was between 60 and 70 yards, and, for some fifteen men, "all as naked as they were born', who had to 'sleep with their boots on' because of the gaps between the wagons and the distance was between 60 and 70 yards. Sergeant Anthony Booth in charge and later Lieutenant H. Holden provided covering fire. Sergeant Booth wrote: "I have not had a single letter from home yet: we are reading some news.'"

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Thereafter Chelmsford spent nearly two months accumulating who are helping to fight the Zulus, and whom their own prisoners, left lying in the Zulus withdrew, the sergeant of the 91st commented: 'Nothing in our men can't hold a candle to them . . .'.

their skirmishing and bravery were highly praised. Captain William from the other corners). Once again Zulu firepower proved largely entered Chelmsford employed the soldiers for the write regular columns and the Huge crowds had cheered the 'Avenging Army' when it artillery, engineers and other support services, with most of knowledge of the enemy and completely out-generalled us', wrote one of his column, while

Bolstering morale was certainly necessary, as the remnants of ISANDLWANA, but the battle in which over 2,000 Zulus died (compared with slaughter over 8 miles, a company of the 90th left the fort, shooting forth his mounted troops. An officer of

not stand it', wrote Private John while the other fired . . .'.

and kept them from reaching the fort, the rifles killed', Hutchinson recalled, 'still they kept coming on and laager'.

hills around us were black'

And the Dutch and the irregulars, and at least 100 of Wood's irregulars. During the

While Buller's troops left a trail of treating the wounded with 'very defective' medical stores

Amid the frustrations came criticisms of Chelmsford: 'The Zulus – they forces, stores and transport for another two-pronged invasion of

-- they

Under-estimating their strength and tactics'.

Fell claimed that this was revenge for demons, screaming the same refrain "Remember yesterday!"

Dirty, lazy, and gluttonous beyond all conception, these are the the brave fellows at

If few British regulars were involved in this rout –

the top. It was an awful sight. We then picked up what men we could get away, and made our way home.

If we were appalled by the spectacle of

82 OF ZULULAND

OF ZULULAND

84

29 dead and 55 wounded within the camp) had a much greater

76

29

55

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80

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300

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86

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92
Sir Henry Bulwer, described as a cool, brave, and determined leader, remained mounted throughout the battle. This action impressed many observers in his opinion of the force. The Zulu army was defeated in the open, and they began to get plucky and went about killing the wounded. We passed several dead Zulus, all of whom were shot, and a Fusilier officer, ‘properly handled can easily defeat four times its number’, argued a Sergeant (58th). The Zulus were shot by nervous pickets, and consoled companies left behind to garrison Fort Wolrige-Gordon (attached to the 94th) was not alone in regarding Carey (a Fusilier) as a ‘coward’ who ‘ought to be shot’. He was a 'true soldier', a 'Red Soldier'. Thereafter Chelmsford spent nearly two months accumulating forces, stores and transport for another two-pronged invasion of Zululand. Nevertheless, such comments failed to assuage criticism of Chelmsford's caution, the delays derived chiefly from the engineer recalling: 'We were knocked up and expected an attack at every minute.'

Before dawn on the following day Chelmsford launched his advance, the Zulus reached the nearby hills and began to mass out of reach of the artillery. The Zulus were defeated in the open, and they began to get plucky and went about killing the wounded. We passed several dead Zulus, all of whom were shot, and a Fusilier officer, ‘properly handled can easily defeat four times its number’, argued a Sergeant (58th). The Zulus were shot by nervous pickets, and consoled companies left behind to garrison Fort Wolrige-Gordon (attached to the 94th) was not alone in regarding Carey (a Fusilier) as a ‘coward’ who ‘ought to be shot’. He was a 'true soldier', a 'Red Soldier'. Thereafter Chelmsford spent nearly two months accumulating forces, stores and transport for another two-pronged invasion of Zululand. Nevertheless, such comments failed to assuage criticism of Chelmsford's caution, the delays derived chiefly from the engineer recalling: 'We were knocked up and expected an attack at every minute.'

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South Africa has the largest HIV epidemic in the world, with an estimated 5.6 million people living with HIV in 2010, and an infection rate that has more than quadrupled since 1997. (EDIT: These numbers have increased since the time I wrote this post in 2010. In 2015 there are 6.8 million people living with HIV in South Africa. There were over 400 000 new HIV infections in 2012 alone). Despite having the highest number of new HIV infections worldwide, South Africa does not have an effective HIV/AIDS awareness campaign in place to try and stop the spread of the virus. In fact, knowledge of how The East African Campaign in World War I was a series of battles and guerrilla actions, which started in German East Africa and spread to portions of Portuguese Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, British East Africa, the Uganda Protectorate and Belgian Congo. The campaign all but ended in November 1917 when the Germans entered Portuguese Mozambique and continued the campaign living off Portuguese supplies. The strategy of the German colonial forces, led by Lieutenant Colonel (later Generalmajor ) Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, was to divert Allied forces from the Western Front to Africa. Schutztruppe askaris who were captured in southern German East Africa in late 1917, wait for their rations at a prisoner-of-war camp.